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In the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah

ELIZA RUE WOOD,

Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8886

THEO N. WOOD and
RUTH L. WOOD,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the close of the evidence in the Lower Court, the
respondents moved the Court, pursuant to Rule 50,
U.R.C.P., to direct a verdict in their favor for no cause
of action. Among the various grounds urged in support
of this motion, was the ground that on the uncontroverted
facts, the appellant, admittedly occupying the status of
licensee, had assumed the risk of, or was contributorily
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negligent in, proceeding along a known dangerous route
to obtain entrance to the respondents' home and, in addition, that the respondents had not breached a duty to the
appellant. The Court granted respondents' motion from
which an appeal has been taken.
The appellant has attempted to confine the issue on
appeal to that of contributory negligence, but the ruling
of the trial court was based upon all of the doctrines pertaining to the relationship of a host-licensor to a guestlicensee announced by this Court in the Tempest case,

ultra.
The ruling granting the directed verdict is clearly
supported by the uncontradicted evidence in the record
considered in the light of the law announced by the Supreme Court of Utah and generally adopted throughout
the United States.
FACTS
The facts in this case are generally not disputed nor
significantly controverted by any of the parties. The
statement made by the appellant is generally accurate, but
is significantly silent on the testimony of the appellant and
the facts adduced which support the ruling of the trial
court. We therefore believe a recital of all of the facts
would prove most helpful.
Prior to October 15, 1956, the date of the incident
complained of, the appellant had made two previous visits
to the home of the respondents. The second occasion, she
testified, took place sometime in December of 19 55. On
both of the visits, the appellant entered the home of the
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respondents by using the front walkway and entrance.
(T. 3 8) On the visit in December, the appellant was
shown the entire premises owned by the respondents, including a walkway originating by the garage leading
around to the den in the rear of the house. (T. 51, 53)
She was shown throughout the main floor of the house,
including all of the rooms, and she was shown into the
interior garage area and walked down to the basement
using the very stairway into which she fell on the night
of October 15, 1956, which fall precipitated this litigation. (T. 35, 37, 51, 53)
On the evening of the accident, the appellant travelled to the home of the respondents, arriving there sometime around seven o'clock. It was dark by this time. She
stated that the lights on her husband's car were on when
they drove into the driveway and that her husband stopped
his car opposite the walkway which leads to the front door
of the home of the respondents. (T. 40) In such position,
the headlights of the automobile would shine into and
would illuminate the garage through which appellant
thereafter proceeded. (Ex. 1-P) She stated that there
were no lights on in the front part of the house but that
she could see a light shining through the doorway which
leads from the house to the stairway in the garage area.
Appellant testified that her husband then turned off the
lights of the car and she proceeded from the car into the
then darkened garage area, a route she had not traversed
before. (T. 40) In this regard, her testimony from the
record is as follows (T. 40, Line 2) :

Q: Now, you stated that it was dark, I believe?
Could you tell me, was it dark enough to see
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where you were going on the evening of October 15th when you proceeded into the garage?
A: Well, I wouldn't have known too well where
I was going if I hadn't seen this light there.
Q: ... could you see where you ·were stepping?
A: Well, no.
Q: It was so dark that you couldn't see where
you were stepping then?

A: Yes.
In spite of not being able to see where she was stepping, the appellant proceeded into the respondents' garage
toward the stairway into which she fell. In this regard
the respondent testified (T. 40, Line 23):

Q: ... and you knew that the stairway was in the
garage?
A: I knew the stairway was.
And again (T. 37, Line 1):

Q: ... Now then, when you and your husband
pulled into the driveway on the evening of
October 15, 1956, you knew that the stairway
was in the garage because on your previous
visit you did go down this stairway?

A: Yes.
And again the appellant testified (T. 35, Line 27):

Q: And you knew you were in the garage when
you made the previous visit (the visit in
December)?

A: Yes.
Q: So you knew the stairway was there and knew
that it was in the garage?
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A: Yes.

Q: And you knew it on the evening of October
15, 1956, did you not?
A: Yes.
It is not rebutted in this record that neither of the
respondents expected the appellant to use the garage to
enter the home. (T. 66, 78) It was expected, on the other
hand, that all visitors would use the front door and on all
previous visits to the home of the respondents, the appellant
had used the front door. (T. 77) It is further significant
to note that the appellant did not even attempt to contradict the testimony of Ruth Wood to the effect that
immediately after the accident, when Theo Wood asked
if she didn't remember that the stairway was there, the
appellant replied ttyes," but because she had been so upset
over the wedding she had temporarily forgotten. (T. 78)
In summary then this record shows from the testimony of the appellant and without dispute or contradiction that she was familiar with the premises she was
entering and she was particularly familiar with the stairway into which she fell and its location in the garage. She
had two known alternate safe routes to travel into the
home of the respondents and the respondents expected
her to use the front entrance only. In spite of this knowledge possessed by the appellant, she proceeded into the
darkened area, to which no license had been extended,
after her husband had turned off the lights on the vehicle
which would illuminate her course of travel and she fell
into a known stairwell even though she was proceeding
without being able to see where she stepped. May we fur-
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ther make the observation that the light coming from the
door of the den, to be seen by the appellant, would have
to shine directly over the stairway into which she fell and
such light would certainly reveal to a reasonably alert person
that no barrier existed between the door and the observer
and around the stairwell.
Moreover, there is no showing nor even an allegation
of an affirmative act on the part of these respondents
which contributed in any way to appellant's fall.
These uncontroverted facts when considered with
the law announced by this Court and unanimous authority in the United States, substantiates the Lower Court's
order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE ADMITTED
FACTS AND THE LAW ESTABLISHED BY THIS
COURT.

A. The Appellant Was A Licensee On The Responddents' Premises And The Respondents Did Not Breach
A Duty Owing The Appellant.
B. Appellant Knew Of The E:xiste-~tce Of The Stairway In The Garage And Must Therefore Be Charged With
Assu11tPtion Of Risk Or Contributory Negligence As A
Matter Of Law.
C. Appellant Proceeded Into A1z Area Without Being
Able To See Where She Was Going And When Alternate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

Safe Routes Were Available~ She Must, Therefore, Be
Charged With Contributory Negligence Or Assumption
Of Risk As A Matter Of Law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE ADMITTED
FACTS AND THE LAW ESTABLISHED BY THIS
COURT.
A. The Appellant Was A Licensee On The Respondents' Premises And The Respondents Did Not Breach A
Duty Owing The Appellant.
The Appellant conceded at the time of the trial that
she was only a guest-licensee on the premises of the Respondents. It is most important to bear this status of the
Appellant constantly in mind, because the authorities, so
far as we have been able to determine, are unanimous in
holding that the only duty which a host owes to a social
guest is to refrain from affirmative acts likely to cause
injury and to warn the guest-licensee of hidden or concealed dangers which the guest-licensee can be expected
to encounter and of which the guest does not know or by
the exercise of reasonable care cannot see and avoid.

Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174
Tarreiau vs. Meghrigia.n, 99 A. 2d 207
Niebes vs. Order of Eagles, 114 N.E. 2d 260
Keretian vs. Asadourian, 110 N.E. 2d 679
Schiebel vs. Lipton, 102 N.E. 2d 453
Bogateroff vs. Coplan, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 205
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Lubenow vs. Cock, 79 A 2d 826
O'Brien vs. Shea, 96 N.E. 2d 163
McHenry vs. Howells, 272 P. 2d 210
Furthermore a host is not liable to a guest for ordinary acts of negligence.

Niebes vs. Order of Eagles, Supra.
Biggs vs. Bea.r, 51 N.E. 2d 79
The rule is likewise well established that a guestlicensee takes the premises of his host-licensor as he finds
them and the host-licensor is only obligated to provide the
guest-licensee with the same protection which he takes for
himself and members of his own family, and no more.

Taneiau vs. Meghrigian, Supra.
Vogel vs. Eckert, 91 Atl. 2d 633
McHenry vs. Howells, Supra.
Biggs vs. Bear, Supra.
The law is also well established that a host-licensor is
not the insurer of the safety of a guest-licensee and is under no duty to reconstruct his premises for the safety of
a guest-licensee.

Scheibel vs. Lipton, Supra.
McHenry vs. Howells, Supra.
In two very respectable jurisdictions in this country
it has been held that there must be evidence of willful and
wanton injury before a host-licensor can be held liable to
a guest-licensee for injuries sustained on the premises of
the host.

Keretian vs. Asadourian, Supra.
Gregory vs. Loder, 185 A 360 (N.J.)
As stated in Ashley vs. Jones, 271 P. 2d 918:
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HThe duty with respect to a licensee is somewhat
different (than an invitee) , the owner not being
liable for injuries resulting from a condition of the
premises, other than one amounting to a trap, in
the absence of some active negligence on the part
of the owner. Oettinger vs. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d
133, 148 P. 2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221."
(Emphasis Supplied)
Text authorities have spoken on the subject also and
it has been announced in 38 Am. fur. 778:
({There is no duty on the part of the host to reconstruct or improve the premises for the purpose of
making his house more convenient or more safe for
those accepting his hospitality, gratuitously extended. A better reason for the rule is that a host
merely offers his premises for enjoyment by his
guest with the same security that the host and the
members of his family who reside with him have."

It is further stated in 65 C.].S. 495:
HA mere licensee takes the property or premises on
which he enters as he finds them, enjoys the license
subject to its concomitant perils, and, although he
does not necessarily assume all risk of injury by
going on another's premises, he does assume all of
the ordinary risks, all danger incident to the condition of the premises or property, particularly
risks which are obvious and patent. A social guest
on the host's premises or in his home must take the
premises as he finds them, with no greater right
than a mere licensee with respect to the host's liability for injuries to the guest."
(Emphasis Supplied)
The Supreme Court of Utah recently reaffirmed these
rules in the case of Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174,
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wherein Justice Wade speaking for the Court stated:
((Respondents did nothing to injure their guest.
When appellant accepted respondents' hospitality,
she accepted the conditions ordinarily prevalent in
their home and cannot be heard to complain about

the manner in which they constructed their home."
(Emphasis Supplied)
and further:
cc • • • the (lower) court did not err in granting the
summary judgment in favor of respondents because appellant's own deposition establishes that
respondents did no act which could be reasonably
found to have actively contributed towards her
injury .... "

These rules are directly applicable to the case at bar.
Here, there is no evidence or even an allegation by the
appellant that the respondents did an affirmative act which
would conceivably contribute to the fall sustained by the
appellant. Significantly, neither of the respondents even
knew the appellant had entered upon their premises prior
to the time of her mishap.
Under these uncontroverted facts and the rules announced by this Court in Tempest vs. Richardson, Supra,
no issue remained which required the deliberations of a
jury to resolve.

B. Appellant Knew Of The Existence Of The Stairway In The Garage And Must Therefore Be Charged With
Assumption Of Risk Or Contributory Negligence As A
Matter Of Law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It hardly seems necessary to recite here that the
record in this case clearly establishes that the appellant
knew of the existence of the stairway and its location in
the garage she was entering. She had, on her previous visit
to the home, proceeded out through the den door and then
turned left toward the entrance to the garage and walked
down the stairway to and into the basement. On the
evening of the accident, the appellant, admittedly possessed
of this knowledge, nevertheless, proceeded directly toward
the same den door from the garage entrance and would
have had to pass directly into the open stairwell. In this
regard the appellant testified (T. 35, Line 27):

Q: And you knew you were in the garage when
you made the previous visit?

A: Yes.

Q: So you knew the stairway was there and knew
that it was in the garage?

A: Yes.

Q: And you knew it on the evening of October
15, 1956, did you not?

A: Yes.
Further, appellant testified (T. 37, Line 1):

Q: . . . Now then, when you and your husband
pulled into the driveway on the evening of
October 15, 1956, you knew that the stairway
was in the garage because on your previous
visit you did go down this stairway?

A: Yes.
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The appellant cannot escape the consequence of her
own testimony which clearly establishes that she knew the
existence of the stairwell and of its relative position in the
garage. These facts fit the announced rules and supports
the ruling of the lower court.

The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 340,
states:
HA possessor of land is not subject to liability to
his licensees, whether business visitors or gratuitous
licensees, for bodily harm caused to them by any
dangerous condition thereon, whether natural or
artificial, if they know of the condition and realize
the risk involved therein."
(Emphasis supplied)
And further, in sub-section e, entitled ((Assumption
of Risks by Licensee," it is said:
HA licensee's privilege to enter land in the possession of another is derived solely from the possessor's
consent which he is free to give or withhold, the
licensee not being entitled to enter without it. The
licensee, is, therefore, entitled to nothing more than
knowledge of the actual conditions, which he will
encounter if he avails himself of the possessor's
consent. If he knows the conditions, he has an
opportunity to exercise an intelligent choice as to
whether the advantage to be gained frmn his entry
is sufficient to justifJ' hint in incurring the risk
which he knows is inseparable front it."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court of Utah in Scofield vs. SprouseReitz Company, 265 P 2d 396: has adopted the general
rule as stated on Page 861 of 38 Am. fur:
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As it generally is expressed a plaintiff will not
be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that he had no knowledge or
means of knowledge of the danger, and conversely,
he will be deemed to have been guilty if it is shown
that he knew or reasonably should have known of
the peril and might have avoided it by the exercise
of ordinary care. . . . " See also Knox vs. Snow,
(Utah) 229 P. 2d 874.

cc •••

On these facts and the announced law there is no
issue to submit to a jury. Charged with the admitted
knowledge, the appellant must be charged with the corallary law. It follows that the respondents' motion for a
directed verdict was properly granted.

C. Appellant Proceeded Into An Area Without
Being Able To See Where She Was Going And When Alternate Safe Routes Were Available. She Must, Therefore,
Be Charged With Contributory Negligence Or Assumption
Of Risk As A Matter Of Law.
The appellant testified that as she proceeded into the
garage area, after the lights on the car driven by her husband had been turned off, it was so dark she could not see
where she was placing her feet.
(Her testimony places great weight on the fact that
the respondents had not turned on a light to illuminate
her course of travel. This, under the facts and the law,
we deem of no significance, but we cannot resist the
temptation to say that if the appellant was so apprehensive of the darkness in the area she was traversing, she
should have exercised greater caution. Moreover, it would
have been a simple thing to have left on the lights of the
car in which she had arrived. Could it reasonably be held
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that a licensee has a lesser duty to provide available light
than a licensor?)
Getting back, though, to the basic proposition. Will
the appellant be held to be free of negligence by proceeding with abandon into an area which was so dark she
couldn't even see where she was placing her feet? We believe that a quotation from the recent Supreme Court
case of Tempest vs. Richardson, Supra., is directly in point,
where Justice Wade, speaking for the Court said:
((Had appellant exercised ordinary and reasonable
care for her own safety she would not have opened
a door and stepped into a dark and unlighted area
with which she was unacquainted, without first
ascertaining what was beyond the door...."
and further:
u • • • entering a darkened area without first observing whether it was safe to do so was a failure on
her part to exercise reasonable care to discover and
avoid any danger to herself."

A plaintiff complained of inadequate light in the case
of Hertz vs. the Advertising Compan)', Supra., and the
Alabama Court succinctly disposed of this contention by
saytng:

uwe

are of the opinion that the undisputed evidence showed plaintiff to have been guilty of negligence . . . if they (the premises) were not properly
lighted, she (the plaintiff) should have been more
careful in going out of the vestibule into the main
office building."
Although a lesser legal duty is involved in the case
at bar, the foregoing rules have been adopted in the law
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pertaining to motor vehicles in this state. Several cases
have been decided by our Supreme Court in which it has
been held to constitute negligence for a driver to operate
a car when he cannot see what is ahead of him.

Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 U tab 465
Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co. 80
Utah 331
Hansen vs. Clyde, 89 Utah 31.
If the foregoing cases constitute authority in this
state and if it is negligence for a driver to operate an automobile so that he cannot stop it within the distance he
can see ahead of him, how may one step forward into
blackness and escape the charge that he was negligent in
so doing?
As the cases above cited hold, one who is upon premises with which he is familiar, or even unfamiliar, may
not assume any condition of safety beyond his range of
vision, especially if concealed by darkness. One should not
be heard to complain if he proceeds into an area where he
cannot see what lies before him, especially if, as here, he is
familiar with and has previously been apprised of the
conditions present.
We believe it is of further weight to draw to the
attention of the Court that there were alternate routes
available to the appellant which she was familiar with and
which she had traveled before. These settled facts should
be considered in light of the recent Jury Instructions For
Utah, No. 16.3 entitled rrchoice of Unsafe Alternative
Path as Contributory Negligence," which reads:
ulf the plaintiff (party) had two (stairways)
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(methods of proceeding) by which he might (proceed) (leave) the defendant's place of business one
of which was safe, and one of which he kne~ or
in the exercise of reasonable care would have bad
reasonable grounds to believe was unsafe, it was
(his) duty to select the safe (stairway) (method
of proceeding) and failure to do so would be
negligence."
The authority established in this state is extensive and
persua,.5ive in support of the lower court's ruling on the
respondents' motion for a directed verdict.
ANSWER TO ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT
In the appellant's brief, substantial argument is made
toward showing this Court when a directed verdict may
or may not be granted. We are certain the Court is fully
acquainted with these rules and that the Court still is of
the opinion that a motion for a directed verdict occupies
a useful tool in the administration of justice. Needless to
say, when the record is clear and no significant or substantial dispute exists in the evidence received during the course
of a proceeding, no fact issue exists upon which a jury
need deliberate. This is such a proceeding and the cases
and authorities cited by the appellant on contributory
negligence constitute no precedent to disturb the present
ruling.
Appellant has cited only the case of Wilkerson vs.
McCarthy, 69 S. Ct. 413 and the case of Deacy vs. McDowell, 38 A 2d 181, which need mention. The Wilkerson
case involved an F.E.L.A. situation with significantly different statutory obligations and duties and constitutes no
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authority to decide the issues here before the Court. The
Deacy case, on the other hand, was presented and argued
to this Court in the recent case of Tempest vs. fuchardson,
supra., and the questionable rule there announced has now
been refuted in Utah for the reason that the rule and doctrine there adopted was contrary to the holding of the
Deacy case.
The appellant further argues that there should have
been a railing around the stairwell and that she could
((assume" that one would have been installed subsequent
to her visit in December after her daughter-in-law had
informed her they ((planned" to put up a railing. The
answer to this contention is, that a guest takes the premises of his host as he finds them and enjoys the premises
subject to the incident perils. (See Point I A hereof)
Here the guest-licensee had previously been on the
premises, was never informed a railing had been erected,
knew of the existence of the stairwell, failed to leave her
car lights on, was walking in an area where she could not
make observations and knew of alternative safe routes to
walk-all without the respondents' knowing that she was
present.
CONCLUSION
The appellant is here complaining of the manner in
which the home of another was constructed and, by such
diversionary tactics, gain a further consideration by the
courts. This case was fully heard below and the record is
clear as to what the facts are. For very compelling reasons,
the trial court has directed a verdict predicated upon the
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testimony of this appellant and the law announced in the
Tempest case, supra.
The record conclusively demonstrates that this case
was properly removed from the jury province for the
reason that there existed no issue for their deliberation.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY and NEBEKER,

C. PRESTON ALLEN,
Attorneys for Respondents
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